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IV.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Recommendation, and the accompanying Order filed January 31, 2012.

II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellant Rubio Izaguirre ("Claimant") brought his case against the Defendants, R&L
Carriers Shared Services, LLC., and Zurich American Insurance Co., to determine whether the
Industrial Commission ("Commission") has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable value of the
elements of the claim brought by Claimant and his wife against a third-party tortfeasor, and
whether Defendants' subrogation rights under Idaho Code § 72-223(3) extended to all of
Claimant's third-party tort settlement, including any monies which Claimant received for pain
and suffering, and money which Claimant's wife received for a loss of consortium claim. The
Industrial Commission found that it did have jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable value of the
elements of Claimant's third-party settlement pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-707 and heard expert
testimony as to the reasonable value of the Claimant's wife's loss of consortium component of
the third party settlement. The Industrial Commission did find that the loss of consortium claim
of Claimant's wife was not subject to the Defendants' subrogation rights.

The Industrial

Commission, however, declined to make a finding as to how much of the Claimant's third-party
settlement were general damages and found that pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(3), the
worker's compensation surety had subrogation rights against all other elements of the Claimant's
third-party settlement including any monies Claimant received for pain and suffering or general
damages.
It is from this holding that the Claimant appeals.
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III. STATEMENT OF FACT
Claimant hereby adopts by reference the Industrial Commission's findings of fact
contained in paragraphs 1

30 of the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions or Law, and

Order.

A. Additional Facts
In addition, Claimant offered testimony at the hearing with regard to the medical
expenses, loss of wages and other special damages incurred by the Claimant at the time of his
third-party settlement as follows:
1. Past Medical Expenses

$20,374.02

2. Past Indemnity Benefits

$23,144.63.

In addition, Claimant offered testimony and evidence at the hearing establishing that
Claimant's future special damages would, in all probability, fall within certain ranges:
3. Future Medical Expense

$27,500.00 (Averaged)

4. Future Indemnity Benefits

$17,442.00 (Averaged)

Claimant also offered evidence at hearing with regard to the loss of consortium claim as
claimed by Claimant's wife as noted above and requested that the Industrial Commission make
specific findings with regard to this proof and also with regard to the Claimant's general
damages, both past and future, as a result of the accident at issue. Specifically, the Claimant
requested that the Industrial Commission make a finding that Claimant's general damage, as a
result of his knee injury and the past consequences thereof and the future consequences thereof
would total at least $61,539.35.
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Despite this request, the Industrial Commission made no specific findings with regard to
the elements of Claimant's case and found that the Claimant's entire recovery was subject to the
subrogation rights of the worker's compensation surety pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-223(3).
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IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL
( 1) Whether the Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in deciding that the

Defendants' subrogation rights pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(3) extend to all of Claimant's
third-party settlement, including any monies which Claimant received for pain and suffering and;
(2) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in failing to designate part of Claimant's
settlement as pain and suffering.
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V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the Supreme Court reviews the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by
the Industrial Commission, the Court exercises free review of questions of law. Hughen v.

Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002). Statutory interpretation is a
pure question of law. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201,203,46 P.3d 18,20 (2002).
As a matter of policy, the Court "must liberally construe the provisions of the workers'
compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for which the
law was promulgated." Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 345, 109 P.3d 1084, 1087
(2005). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction.

Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P.2d 759, 760(1996).
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VI. ARGUMENT
(1) The Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in deciding that the
Defendants' subrogation rights pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(3) extend to all of
Claimant's third-party settlement, including any monies which Claimant received
for pain and suffering.

Claimant contends that the Industrial Commission herein erred in its interpretation of
Idaho Code § 72-223(3). Based upon this error in interpretation, the Industrial Commission felt
it unnecessary to address all of Claimant's arguments with regard to the proper apportionment of
his third-party recovery.

Claimant first contends that the Industrial Commission erred in its

statutory construction of Idaho Code§ 72-223(3). This statute reads as follows:
"If compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer
having paid such compensation or having become liable therefor,
shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee, to recover
against such third party to the extent of the employer's
compensation liability."
Idaho Code§ 72-223 (Emphasis Added.)
In denying to exercise its jurisdiction to evaluate and apportion the elements of the
Claimant's third-party settlement with respect to Claimant's general damages, the Commission
found that "a plain reading of the statute fails to reveal an intention on the part of the legislature
to limit a surety's subrogated interest in a third party recovery to that portion of the third party
recovery which corresponds to a benefit payable under the workers' compensation laws of this
state." (R p. 16,

~

45). Claimant contends that the Commission's broad interpretation of the

statute is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and renders the term "compensation
liability" superfluous.
Furthermore, statutory language in the Idaho Code related to the subrogation rights of
other sureties, statutes that are preexisting the Worker's Compensation Act, show that the
Legislature has allowed other sureties unlimited rights of subrogation in clear and concise
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- PG. 6

language. Presuming that the Legislature has knowledge of these unrestricted subrogation rights,
it must be presumed that the Legislature placed limited language in Idaho Code § 72-223(3) on
purpose. Claimant contends, therefore, that the Commission's interpretation ofldaho Code§ 72223(3) is erroneous. Claimant contends that the plain language of the statute limits a workers'
compensation surety to exercising its right of subrogation to areas of damages for which it would
be liable under Idaho Workers' Compensation law.
A.

The plain language of Idaho Code § 72-223(3) limits a surety's right of subrogation.

As a pure question of law, the Supreme Court exercises free review of statutory
interpretation. Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642,650,262 P.3d 671,679 (2011). In doing so,
a Court must look to the language used in the statute, giving the words used their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning, and interpret the statute as a whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827,25 P.3d
850 (2001). Additionally, in ascertaining the meaning of the words used, the Court should avoid
an interpretation that would render certain words void, superfluous, or redundant.

State v.

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).
i)

The Commission's broad interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-223(3) renders
the term "compensation" superfluous.

The dispute in this case centers on the final phrase m Idaho Code § 72-233(3).
Specifically, the extent of a surety's right of subrogation appears to tum on the phrase, "to the
extent of the employer's compensation liability." As a first step in analyzing this statutory
language, it is helpful to explore the defined meaning of the term "compensation," which the
legislature used to modify the word "liability."
The Idaho Worker's Compensation law defines all of the benefits to which a Claimant
may be entitled pursuant to that law in the definitions section of the Worker's Compensation Act.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1 02(7), these benefits collectively are defined as follows:
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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'"Compensation' used collectively means any or all of the income
benefits and the medical and related benefits and medical
services."
Income benefits are further defined in Idaho Code § 72-1 02( 16) as follows:
"(16) 'Income benefits' means payments provided for or made
under the provisions of this law to the injured employee disabled
by an injury or occupational disease, or his dependents in case of
death, excluding medical and related benefits."
Medical services and medical and related benefits are also defined in the Idaho Worker's
Compensation Act as follows:
"(20) 'Medical and related benefits' means payments provided for
or made for medical, hospital, burial and other services as provided
in this law other than income benefits.
(21) 'Medical Services' means medical, surgical, dental or other
attendance for treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicines,
apparatus, appliances, prosthesis, and related services, facilities
and supplies."
In examining these provisions, it becomes clear that any benefit awarded to a Claimant in
a worker's compensation case is defined and regulated by the Idaho Worker's Compensation
Act. As noted by Idaho Code§ 72-201, the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act was enacted as a
substitute for a Plaintiff or Claimant's common law rights. Injured workmen in the State of Idaho
have given up their common law rights in place of the Worker's Compensation Act.
72-201 Declaration of Police Power. - The common law system
governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries
received from and occupational diseases contracted in industrial
and public work is inconsistent with modem industrial conditions.
The welfare of the State depends upon its industries and even more
upon the wealth of its wage workers. The State of Idaho,
therefore, exercising herein is policed in sovereign power, declares
that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private
controversy, and insuring certain relief for injured worker's and
their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of
questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy,
proceeding or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- PG. 8

this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action
for personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the Court and the State
over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this law
provided.
In examining the provisions that set the boundaries of an employer's "compensation"
liability, it is important to note that none of these provisions provide for the payment of an
injured employee's general damages. That is to say, unlike a Plaintiff in a personal injury action,
a Claimant in a workers' compensation action is not permitted to recover for general damages
against the employer.

Indeed, as the term "compensation" makes evident, general damages

would fall beyond the extent of an employer's compensation liability.
Claimant contends that the legislature's use of the modifier, "compensation," when
describing the extent of an employer's right of subrogation indicates the desire to limit the right
of subrogation. To be sure, had the Legislature intended to give the surety an unlimited right of
subrogation, the statute would have been drafted much differently and would have plainly and
unequivocally bestowed such an unlimited right. However, the Legislature chose to include
modifYing and limiting language in drafting Idaho Code § 72-223(3). This Court must presume
that the Legislature intended to give these limiting and modifying words significance and effect.
Under the foregoing analysis, the intended significance of the defined term
"compensation" appears to act as a limitation on the surety's right of subrogation. It seems
highly unlikely that the Legislature would intend for the workers' compensation surety to receive
a windfall by recovering for damages for which it did not insure. Claimant contends that the
Commission's interpretation, which would serve to allow a workers' compensation surety to
satisfy its right of subrogation to categories of damages beyond its compensation liability,
renders the term "compensation" superfluous and is therefore erroneous.

Claimant's

interpretation is further supported by another Idaho statute related to the subject of subrogation.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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u.

The Legislature's use of restrictive language in Idaho Code Sections 72223(3) indicates an intention to limit a workers' compensation surety's
right of subrogation.

In construing the language of a statute, Courts presume that the Legislature, upon
enacting a statute, has knowledge of all other statutes in existence at the time of enactment. Twin
Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 218,254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011).

Idaho Code Sections 72-223, originally codified in 1971, and 12-616, last amended in
1919, address the subject of a surety's right of subrogation to a Claimant's third party recovery
as a matter of law.

Section 12-616 addresses a surety's right of subrogation outside of a

worker's compensation context. Important to note in the general subrogation provision of Title
12 is the language used by the Legislature to explicitly characterize the extent of the surety's
right of subrogation against a third party award.
Idaho Code § 12-616 reads:
"Whenever any surety on an undertaking on appeal, executed to
stay proceedings upon a money judgment, pays the judgment,
either with or without action, after its affirmation by the appellate
court, he is substituted to the rights of the judgment creditor and is
entitled to control, enforce and satisfy such judgments in all
respects as if he had recovered the same."
Idaho Code§ 12-616 (Emphasis Added).
The language used in this statute leaves no uncertainty as to the surety's broad statutory
right of subrogation. The surety's right of subrogation is essentially unlimited in that the surety
is entitled to "satisfy such judgments in all respects." To be sure, this language gives a surety the
absolute right to satisfy its interests in all aspects of any recovery. By contrast, within the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Act, the legislature limited a surety's right of subrogation "to the extent
ofthe employer's compensation liability."
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The differing language in Idaho Code § 72-223, a statute enacted decades after the Title
12 subrogation statute, strongly indicates the legislature's intent to treat the workers'
compensation surety as a uniquely situated subrogee.

Because an employer has limited

compensation liability to a Claimant under the Workers' Compensation Act, it logically follows
that these same employers would have limited rights with respect to subrogation. In addition to
the inclusion of the modifier, "compensation," as discussed above, had the legislature intended
Section 72-223(3) to give the workers' compensation surety absolute rights to all of a Claimant's
third party recovery, the legislature could have mirrored the all-encompassing language found in
Section 12-616.

Instead of utilizing the broad phraseology conferring an absolute right of

subrogation as it had in Idaho Code § 12-616, the legislature used language of limitation by
drafting the workers' compensation statute to read, "[the employer] shall be subrogated to the
rights of the employee, to recover against such third party to the extent of the employer's
compensation liability" in Idaho Code§ 72-223(3).
Claimant contends that for the reasons set forth above, the Commission's broad
interpretation of a workers' compensation surety's right of subrogation is in conflict with the
plain language of the statute.
B.

Claimant's interpretation of I. C. § 72-223(3) is supported by cases from other states
with similar workers' compensation subrogation statutes.

The state of Kentucky has a statute similar to Idaho Code § 72-223. The text of the
Kentucky statute reads in pertinent part:
"Whenever an injury for which compensation is payable under this
chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some
other person than the employer a legal liability to pay damages, the
injured employee may either claim compensation or proceed at law
by civil action against such other person to recover damages, or
proceed both against the employer for compensation and such
other person to recover damages, but he shall not collect from both
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- PG. 11

.... If compensation is awarded under this chapter, the employer,
his insurance carrier, the special fund, and the uninsured
employer's fund, or any of them, having paid the compensation or
having become liable therefore, may recover in his or its own name
or that of the injured employee from the other person in whom
legal liability for damages exists, not to exceed the indemnity paid
and payable to the injured employer, less the employee's legal fees
and expense."

Mastin v. Liberal Markets, 674 S.W.2d 7, 10-11 (Ky. 1984) (citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.700)

(Emphasis Added)
When comparing the Idaho and Kentucky statutory schemes with respect to subrogation,
the similarities are noteworthy. Most significant to the case at bar is the right of subrogation
granted to a workers' compensation surety after the Claimant receives a settlement or award
from a third party defendant. Under Kentucky law, the employer is entitled to recovery "not to
exceed the indemnity paid and payable to the injured employer," less attorney's fees. This is
similar to Idaho's provision that limits an employer's right of subrogation "to the extent of the
employer's compensation liability."

In a case raising the same issue of statutory interpretation

now before this Court, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed its state's statutory language
related to an employer's right of subrogation.
In Mastin, supra, an injured worker brought a third-party case and made a settlement of
that case after inhaling insecticides on the job. 674 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1984). In interpreting the
Kentucky law quoted above, the court squarely addressed the issue of the subrogation of general
damages now before this Court. !d. at 11-12.
In its decision, the Kentucky court noted that the settlement made by the injured Claimant
of $50,000.00 had been apportioned by the Claimant and the third-party only and therefore noted
that the apportionment was not binding on the workers' compensation surety. !d. at 11. The
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Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the worker's compensation surety was entitled to
a full and fair and impartial decision as to the correct amount to be attributed to each element of
damages for which the Claimant sought recovery. !d. at 13.
In order to further guide the parties on remand, the Kentucky Court further noted that the
workers' compensation right was limited to those elements of Claimant's recovery which were
duplicated by the workers' compensation benefits paid and specifically found that if the third
party settlement was found to include elements not included in the workers' compensation
recover such as pain and suffering, the surety had no right to access those benefits. !d. at 12.
In limiting the workers' compensation surety's right of subrogation against a third party
tort settlement, the court in Mastin, cited and relied upon the case of Hillman v. American
Mutual Liability Insurance Company, 631 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1982), the leading case in Kentucky

on the issue of workers' compensation subrogation rights. In Hillman, an injured worker had
brought a third-party case and had proceeded to trial before a judge to determine damages. !d. at
848.

The worker's compensation insurance company had intervened to assert its claim for

subrogation and also presented evidence to the trial court. !d. After evidence demonstrating the
medical expenses, weekly benefits and future benefits to be paid to the injured Claimant under
the worker's compensation law and additional benefits demonstrating his tort damages, the trial
court made specific findings as to each of the specified elements. !d. at 848-849. A dispute
arose thereafter as to whether or not the worker's compensation insurance company could
exercise its subrogated rights as against those elements of the damages not insured by workers'
compensation, and the court determined that the statute limited subrogation to only damages
covered by the worker's compensation laws. !d. at 849-850.
Construing the Kentucky statute quoted above, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that
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the workers' compensation surety was indeed subrogated to those items which were covered and
which they would have to pay in the future. !d. However, the court found that other items, such
as pain and suffering, were beyond the reach of the worker's compensation surety because the
workers' compensation surety would not and had not paid those types of benefits to the injured
Claimant. !d.
In addition to Kentucky, the State of Washington has interpreted a limitation in its
workers' compensation subrogation statute construing language similar to the language in the
Idaho statute. In Washington, the workers' compensation surety, the Department of Labor and
Industries, is permitted to subrogate against a third party recovery as set forth in RCW
51.24.060(1):
"The distribution formula requires payment in the following order:
(a) attorney's fees and costs, (b) twenty-five percent to the injured
worker free of any claim by the Department, (c) to the Department
the balance of the recovery made, but only to the extent necessary
to reimburse the Department for benefits paid, and (d) to the
injured worker any remaining balance."

Tobin v. Department of Labor & Industries, 169 Wn.2d 396, 239 P.3d 544 (2010) (quoting
Wash. Rev. Code§ 51.24.060) (Emphasis Added).
This Washington statute bears a significant similarity to the Idaho statute addressing the
same subject. Although differing from Idaho in the initial apportionment of the third party
recovery, the Washington statute nonetheless includes language describing the extent to which
the workers' compensation surety can recover under its right of subrogation. Specifically, the
Washington surety can recover "to the extent necessary to reimburse the Department for benefits
paid," much like an Idaho surety can only recover "to the extent of the employer's compensation
liability."
In a recent Washington Supreme Court case rmsmg the same issue of statutory
interpretation now before this Court, the Washington Supreme Court addressed its state's
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- PG. 14

statutory language related to a workers' compensation surety's right of subrogation. In Tobin,

supra, an injured worker who had received workers' compensation benefits also brought a thirdparty case after he was injured when a crane boom, operated by a third-party, swung
unexpectedly and crushed him against a post.

169 Wn.2d at 398, 239 P.3d at 545.

The

Department of Labor & Industries found that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled
and ordered the commencement of lifetime benefits. !d. In the meantime, the injured Claimant
brought a lawsuit against the negligent third-party and settled that case for a significant amount
of money, a large portion of which was categorized as pain and suffering.

Jd.

After the

Department of Labor & Industries indicated that it would exercise the Departments subrogated
right as against the entire settlement, the injured Claimant appealed to the Superior Court,
arguing that the Department was not entitled to subrogate its interest against benefits for which it
would not be liable under the state workers' compensation law. Id. at 399, 545.
The Superior Court, relying on the Washington case, Flanigan v. Department of Labor
& Industries, 123 Wash.2d 418, 869 P.2d 14 (1994), held that Washington surety could only be

reimbursed for benefits which it had paid and that because the Department would not be liable to
compensate the injured claimant for pain and suffering, it could not therefore recover from the
Claimant for those benefits. Tobin at 399, 545.
After intermediate appeal, the Washington Supreme Court, after gomg through a
comprehensive analysis, affirmed and found that the statutory right of subrogation possessed by
the Department only allowed it to recover for damages which it had paid out. Jd. at 404, 548.
In Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court, sitting en bane has reached the same result as
Washington and Kentucky Courts. In the case of Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority

v. Jorgensen, 992 P.2d 1156 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed the appeal of a lower Court's
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decision which held that the worker's compensation insurer was only subrogated to those claims
which it had paid out and not to Claimant's entire personal injury award nor to his wife's loss of
consortium award.
In that case, it appeared that an injured worker and his wife brought a lawsuit against
three separate defendants because of the injury which the Claimant suffered while on the job.
Because the worker was receiving worker's compensation benefits, the Colorado Compensation
Insurance Authority intervened in the litigation. After the worker's compensation Surety and the

Claimant made a settlement with all of the third-parties, the Claimant asked the Court for an
evidentiary hearing to apportion the settlement proceeds between economic, non-economic and
loss of consortium amounts. The trial court denied the Claimant's request and found that the
worker's compensation insurance company had subrogation rights against the entire recovery.
The Court of Appeals in Colorado reversed holding that the trial court had jurisdiction to
apportion the settlement proceeds and that the worker's compensation Surety's subrogation
rights did not extend to the non-economic losses suffered by the Claimant nor did these rights
extend to the claim of the Claimant's spouse for loss of consortium.
After discussing the jurisdictional issue at some length, the Supreme Court turned to the
extent of the worker's compensation insurance company's subrogation rights. Starting from the
statutory framework, the Court noted that the ability of the worker's compensation insurance
company to recover was limited by a statute reading as follows:
The insurance carrier shall not be entitled to recover any sum in
excess of the amount of compensation for which said carrier is
liable under said articles to the injured employee but to that extent
said carrier shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured
employee against said third-party causing the injury.
(See, Wests CRSA 8-41-203(1) (Emphasis Added).
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After citing principles of statutory construction very similar to those here in Idaho, the
Colorado Supreme Court noted that to allow the worker's compensation insurance company
access to the Claimant's pain and suffering recovery and to a claim on the Claimant's wife's loss
of consortium would be in violation of the plain terms of the statute and would allow the
worker's compensation surety to recovery for benefits for which it had never paid in the first
place.

Citing Tate v. Industrial Claims Appeal Office, 815 P.2d 15, 16 (Colo. 1991), the

Supreme Court of Colorado held that the insurers subrogation rights are not absolute and do not
extend to every right that the Claimant or her dependents have against a third-party tortfeasor.
See also, Martinez v. St. Joseph Hospital and Nursing Home of Del Norte, Inc., 878 P.2d 13, 15
1~1

lit

Il

w,

(Colo.App. 1993).
Addressing the ever present argument against allowing a Claimant's double recovery, the
Supreme Court of Colorado noted as follows:
"An important policy of a statute is to avoid double recoveries by
Claimant. (Citations omitted). CCIA argues that Jorgensen would
receive a double recovery which it could not exercise its
subrogation rights against his entire net recovery. We find this
argument unpersuasive.
Under our interpretation of the section, the Claimant receives no
double recovery. The double recovery occurs when the Claimant
receives worker's compensation benefits, such as medical costs
and lost wages, and recovers those same benefits from the
tortfeasor without reimbursing the insurer. No double recovery
occurs when the Claimant receives worker's compensation benefits
from the insurer and non-economic benefits from the tortfeasor
because the Claimant only receives the damages that he would be
entitled to if he had only pursued his personal injury claims: noneconomic and economic damages."
(See, 992 P.2d at 1165-1166).

Claimant herein contends that the interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-223 which he
advances in this case likewise does not provide for a double recovery. Allowing a Claimant to
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retain the proceeds of his pain and suffering award in a third-party settlement does not mean that
Claimant will have a double recovery. Claimant would still be obligated to return the worker's

I••••*'
'

compensation insurance company the net proceeds of the medical benefits, lost wage and
impairment monies which he had received pursuant to his worker's compensation case and
would likewise be obligated to allow the worker's compensation surety a set off of future
medical and wage loss benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223. Allowing a Claimant to retain
his award for pain and suffering does not constitute a double recovery here nor did it in the State
of Colorado.
Based upon the foregoing authorities, Claimant contends that the weight of authority in
this matter demonstrates that a workers' compensation surety should not have any access to that
part of the settlement achieved by the Claimant which is attributable to his pain and suffering.
Worker's compensation does not allow for a Claimant to obtain pain and suffering benefits and
the worker's compensation Surety should therefore not be able to obtain those benefits from the
Claimant.
C.

The Industrial Commission erred in its interpretation of the Court's holding in
Struhs v. Prot. Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 992 P.2d 164 (1999).

In reaching the ultimate decision in this case, the Industrial Commission addressed this

•

Court's previous decision in Struhs v. Prot. Technologies, Inc., supra, at some length.

In

"·"

paragraphs 41 and 42 of the Industrial Commission's decision, see, R. pp. 14-15

~~

41-42, the

Industrial Commission noted that the Struhs case was important to the decision herein but that
the posture of the instant case was much different than the posture of the case in Struhs.
Summarizing, in the Struhs case, a Claimant attorney had made a settlement with a
negligent third-party and had attempted to characterize the nature and extent of that recovery in
its agreement with the third-party, without any participation by the worker's compensation
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surety. The Claimant in Struhs, thereafter attempted to deny any subrogation rights at all by
claiming that the settlement did not include any of the monies which had been paid out by the
workman's compensation surety.
The Industrial Commission found that the Claimant and the third-party could not
unilaterally characterize the settlement made so as to deny subrogation rights to the worker's
compensation surety pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) and, on appeal, this Court affirmed.
In the instant case, the Claimant and the Defendant agreed that the Claimant's previous
attorney's attempt to characterize the nature and extent of the settlement was not binding and
irrelevant to the proceedings. The Industrial Commission summarized the parties approach and
the posture of the proceedings as follows:
"Of course, this case is different from Struhs in that Claimant does
not insist upon the application of the allocation of the proceeds of
settlement which was attempted by Claimant's fonner counsel.
Indeed, Claimant acknowledges that such a unilateral allocation is
invalid under Struhs. Rather, what Claimant proposes is that the
evidentiary hearing of July 26, 2011 provided the parties an
opportunity to adduce evidence and make argument on how the
proceeds of the settlement should be allocated, and in this way
accomplish the allocation which was prohibited by claimant's
unilateral attempt at the same in Struhs. In short, per Claimant,
Struhs does not prohibit the protection of certain elements of a
third party recovery from the subrogation claim of the surety.
Struhs merely prohibits Claimant from undertaking this action
unilaterally. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Idaho
statutory scheme clearly anticipates that the right of subrogation
attaches to the entirety of a third party recovery, less surety's
responsibility for the payment of its proportionate share of costs
and attorney fees. Defendants argue that Struhs is, at the very
least, consistent with the proposition."

(See, R p. 15 ~ 43.)
The Industrial Commission then proceeded to find that the Struhs case concluded that the
language of agreement must be ignored and the worker's compensation surety's right of
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subrogation would need to extend to the entire third-party recovery. The Industrial Commission
reasoned that if the Court had been of the view that Idaho Code § 72-223(3) limited the surety's
right of subrogation, it would have found it necessary to remand the case to the Industrial
Commission.

Because the Court did not make such a remand, the Industrial Commission

concluded that the Court found, in effect, that the entire settlement of the Claimant in Struhs was
subject to the rights of the worker's compensation subrogated interest.

The Commission's

finding at paragraph 43 in this regard reads as follows:
"In the context of the question of whether or not a portion of the
proceeds of a third party settlement are not subject to the I. C. § 72223 right of subrogation, Struhs is just as important for what it
does not say, as what it says. Having specifically found that the
claimant in Struhs could not affect the surety's right of subrogation
by incorporating certain language into the third party settlement to
which surety was not a party, the Court concluded that the
language of the agreement must be ignored, and that surety's right
of subrogation was deemed to extend to the entire third party
recovery. Had the Court been of the view that I.C. § 72-223 limited
surety's right of subrogation to that portion of the proceeds of a
third party recovery which corresponded to workers' compensation
benefits paid, it would, presumably, have found it necessary to
remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings
along the lines of the inquiries which are before the Commission in
the instant matter."
(See, R p. 15 ~ 43). (Emphasis Added).
Claimant contends that the Commission inferred too much from this Court's narrow
holding in Struhs.
Claimant agrees with the Commission's reading of Struhs insofar as Struhs stands for the
proposition that a Claimant cannot unilaterally characterize his third party settlement in such a
way as to affect the employer's statutory right of subrogation. However, Claimant contends that
the Commission's reliance on a matter of procedure to interpret the resolution of an issue not
before the Court is erroneous.
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In Struhs, the Claimant, through his attorney, made a settlement with a third-party
without consultation or agreement by the worker's compensation.

!d. at 717, 166.

The

settlement agreement attempted to classify the Claimant's damages in a third party settlement as
purely non-economic. !d. After the Industrial Commission made findings fully in favor of the
workers' compensation surety ordering repayment, the Claimant filed an appeal. Id. On appeal,
the Supreme Court found that the characterization of the settlement as between the Claimant and
the third-party did not bind the workers' compensation insurance company because they were
not a party to the agreement in the first place. I d. at 721, 170.
In holding for the Employer/Surety, the Court was never presented with a fully developed
record developed by all of the parties to the question as the Court has herein. In the Struhs case,
the Court was simply concerned with a very narrow issue of whether or not a Claimant in a thirdparty could unilaterally restrict the employer's subrogation rights without their participation.
The Court found that a Claimant and third-party could not do so in accord with many decisions
from across the county.
The instant case, however, is presented to the Court on a very different posture. In this
case, as noted by the Industrial Commission, the worker's compensation Surety and the Claimant
participated in a hearing in which both parties were accorded the right to offer evidence and
argument with regard to the proper allocation of the third-party settlement and the legal effect of
that allocation. The posture of this case is much different than the posture of the Struhs case, and

I·~

Claimant contends that the precise question presented herein has never before been addressed to

'0

the Industrial Commission or to the Supreme Court based upon a proper evidentiary and
procedural record.
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Claimant contends that the Industrial Commission's reliance upon the Struhs decision is
misplaced and that the Struhs Court never reached the issue presented herein either expressly or
impliedly.
(2) The Industrial Commission erred in failing to designate part of Claimant's
settlement as pain and suffering.

Because the Industrial Commission made a decision of law that the Defendants herein are
entitled to Claimant's entire settlement, they did not reach the issue of the proper allocation of
Claimant's settlement and decide how much of Claimant's settlement was properly pain and
suffering. Claimant contends that if this Court finds that the Industrial Commission erred in this
legal decision, it will be necessary to remand this case to the Industrial Commission so that
additional factual findings can be made. Claimant therefore requests that this Court remand this
case back to the Industrial Commission for proper factual findings should this Court agree with
the legal argument made above.
VII. SUMMARY

In summary, it appears that the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the
reasonable value of the elements of Claimant's third-party settlement. Indeed, the Commission
has already done so with respect to the loss of consortium component of the third party
settlement in this case. Unfortunately, the Industrial Commission refused to allow Claimant to
keep any part of his general damages or pain and suffering recovery and refused to apportion the

I'Ill
Wh

settlement to demonstrate which part of the settlement constituted this classification of damages.
Claimant contends that the plain language ofldaho Code § 72-223(3) limits a surety from
recovering against damages for which it did not insure. That is to say, the statute would operate
to prohibit the Defendants herein from accessing any part of a settlement designated by the
Industrial Commission as pain and suffering. This view of the statutory language is in accord
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with the Idaho policy that the workers' compensation statutes should be construed broadly in
order to provide a Claimant a fair and equitable recovery. Additionally, Claimant's view of the
limited right of subrogation is supported by out-of-state cases interpreting similar statutory
language.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the limitation on a surety's right of subrogation
would not grant the Claimant a double recovery in this case. Rather, the limitation would allow
the Claimant the opportunity to retain some portion of the third party settlement which he has
realized solely by virtue of his pain and suffering

an area of coverage which the workers'

compensation insurance would never be liable for in the first place. Claimant contends that
allowing the surety to access damages which the Industrial Commission finds to be attributable
to pain and suffering essentially enlarges the rights of the surety to recover against that which it
does not insure; all at the expense of the Claimant's just recovery.
For the forgoing reasons, Claimant respectfully requests this Court find that Idaho Code§
72-223(3) limits a surety's subrogated interest in a third party recovery to that portion of the third
party recovery which corresponds to a benefit payable under the workers' compensation laws of
this state, and to remand this matter to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings
consistent with this finding.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
DATED This

l\

day of June, 2012.

RichardS. Owen

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l\

day of June, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
foregoing document was mailed, U. S. Postage prepaid, to:
Jon Bauman
Kristina Wilson
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an
envelope addressed as above set forth.

Richard S. Owen
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